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Abstract—Multi-Hazards Risk Aggregation (MHRA) 
aggregates risk over different risk contributors and provides a 
final risk index that permits the comparison with safety 
guidelines to support Decision Making (DM). Maturity of the 
risk analysis are always different for different risk 
contributors, resulting in different degrees of confidence on the 
associated results. The difference in maturity, and the sources 
of heterogeneity that cause such differences, should be taken 
into account for supporting a reliable and accurate 
representation of risk in respect of DM.  
In this paper, we first propose a hierarchical framework to 
evaluate the level of maturity of risk assessments in respect of 
DM. The framework consists of different attributes 
(uncertainty, conservatism, knowledge and sensitivity) and 
sub-attributes (availability of data, consistency of data, data 
reliability, experience, and value ladenness) that are believed to 
determine the level of maturity of a risk assessment. 
Evaluation guidelines are pre-defined for facilitating the 
attributes scoring process. Then, the maturity level is 
integrated in MHRA by developing a two-dimensional risk 
aggregation method. Finally, a numerical case study for the 
MHRA of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is carried out to show 
the applicability and the plausibility of the methods. 
Keywords-risk assessment; probablistic safety assessment; 
level of maturity; risk-informed decision making; multi-hazards 
risk aggergation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Probability Safety Assessment (PSA) has been widely 
applied in various industries, e.g., nuclear, aerospace, 
defense, etc. Usually, different hazard groups are involved in 
a PSA (e.g., PSA of nuclear power plants usually involves 
hazard groups like fire, internal flooding, etc.). To make risk-
informed decisions based on the results of PSA, Multi-
Hazard Risk Aggregation (MHRA) is required: all relevant 
information on risk from different contributors is combined, 
arriving at an integrated risk index [1]. Usually, risk-
informed decisions are made by comparing the integrated 
risk index (e.g., core damage frequency, large early release 
frequency, risk increase, etc.) to safety goals and quantitative 
acceptance criteria. 
Currently, most MHRAs are conducted by summing over 
the individual risk indexes for different hazard groups [1]. 
For example, in current PSAs for Nuclear Power Plants 
(NPPs) in France, an overall risk index is computed by 
summing over the risk indexes of hazard groups like internal 
events, fire, etc. The overall risk index is, then, compared to 
safety goals and acceptance guidelines for Risk-Informed 
Decision Making (RIDM) [1].  
A main criticism for the summation-based MHRA 
method is that it ignores the heterogeneities in the trust we 
have on the knowledge we have on the different hazard 
groups. Take again the PSA of nuclear power plants as an 
example. Among the hazard groups, the PSA model has been 
developed for internal events for many years, while 
relatively recently, the PSA for hazard groups like fire has 
started to be investigated [1]. Therefore, we have more trust 
on the PSA for internal events than for fire. The different 
levels of trust, which result from the difference in knowledge 
that supports the risk assessments, must be taken into 
account as they affect the risk-informed decisions based on 
the results of risk analyses [2].  
In this paper, we develop a new MHRA method that 
considers the heterogeneities of trust on the risk assessment 
results from different hazard groups. The trust on a risk 
model is evaluated based on the concept of maturity. 
Maturity of a PSA is defined in this paper as the degree to 
which a PSA is correctly implemented in a way to reflect the 
available knowledge. The rest of this paper is organized as 
follows. In Sect. 2, we present a hierarchical framework for 
assessing the maturity of PSA. Then, in Sect. 3, we develop 
an MHRA method that considers the maturity of the PSAs 
for different hazard groups. Section 4 applies the developed 
methods on a numerical case study. Finally, in Sect 5, the 
paper is concluded with a discussion on potential future 
works. 
II. A HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PSA MATURITY 
ASSESSMENT 
Various works attempt to assess the trust and validity of 
PSAs, e.g., [1-8]. Different elements have been used for 
maturity assessment, e.g., uncertainty, state of knowledge, 
importance of assumptions, difference in level of details and 
analysis of different risk contributors, difference in level of 
conservatism over different hazard groups, accuracy and 
precision in the estimation of the values of the model’s 
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parameters, degree of sensitivity, etc. In this paper, we 
develop a hierarchical framework for maturity assessment 
based on these elements, as shown in Figure 1. 
As shown in Figure 1, four criteria (attributes) are 
defined for maturity assessment:  
z Uncertainty is defined as the imperfection of 
knowledge of the real value of a variable or its 
variability [3]. The uncertainty is an important source 
of differences between the actual values and the values 
predicted by a model [4]. This means that it can 
directly reflect the level of maturity of the analysis and 
it should be addressed when evaluating the level of 
maturity of a risk analysis. 
z Knowledge is the yield of the combination of data and 
information with experience and judgment that support 
decision-making [5]. It is natural that building a 
credible and mature analysis of risk is conditional on 
the robustness and strength of knowledge. In other 
words, knowledge is a direct indication of the level of 
maturity of risk analysis and it should be presented in 
the maturity model. 
z Conservatism in risk management is related to the need 
of overestimating risk rather than underestimating, that 
arises from different considerations and perspectives 
such as concerns regarding the lack of knowledge 
about the nature and magnitude of the hazard [6]. In
general, conservatism in PSA leads to overestimating 
the risks. The degree of conservatism should match the 
requirement of the PSA or otherwise, it might reduce 
the maturity level and mislead the decision maker.  
z Sensitivity refers to how the risk model output changes 
when the input parameters or the background 
knowledge change. In this paper, we mainly focus on 
the sensitivity of the assumptions made in the PSA, 
which indicates the importance of the assumptions 
made and the uncertainty associated with them [7].
The attribute knowledge is further broken down into five 
sub-attributes to make its evaluation, as shown in Figure 1. 
For each criterion and sub-criterion defined in Figure 1, a 
semi-quantitative evaluation is carried out by assigning to it a 
relative score from 1 to 5, based on a set of pre-defined 
scoring criteria. For details of scoring criteria, please refer to 
the Appendix.  
Then, the scores for the criteria and sub-criteria are 
aggregated for maturity assessment. In this paper, as a first 
attempt, all the criteria and sub-criteria are considered 
equally important and the maturity level is calculated as a 
weighted average of the scores of the criteria:  
,  (1)
where  is the level of maturity for hazard group , is 
the score for the -th sub-criterion in the -th evaluation 
criteria, N is the total number of criteria and n is the number 
of sub-criteria related to the th evaluation criterion. 
III. RISK AGGREGATION CONSIDERING MATURITY 
LEVELS
In this paper, we adopt the perspectives of [2] that when 
characterizing risk, not only the probability index estimated 
by PSA, but also the knowledge that supports the PSA 
should be taken into account. Hence, in this paper, we use a 
tuple  to quantify the risk associated with hazard 
group , where  is the risk index estimated from the PSA 
model and  is the maturity of the PSA, evaluated based on 
the method presented in Sect. 2. 
A two-stage aggregation method is, then, developed for 
MHRA considering maturities of hazard groups. Suppose we 
have  hazard groups with the risk tuple h d
 The overall risk tuple can, then, be 
computed in two steps: 
Step 1: Aggregation of risk indexes. Risk indexes are 
aggregated following the summation rule: 
,  (2)
where  is the risk index after considering all the hazard 
groups. The physical meaning of  is the aggregated risk 
index, when we have complete confidence on each of the 
hazard group. 
Step 2: Determine the maturity of the aggregated risk 
assessment: 
,   (3) 
where  is the maturity level of the PSA considering all the 
hazard groups. It should be noted that by using the formula, 
we assume that the least mature hazard group determines the 
maturity of the entire assessment process, i.e., it follows the 
weakest-link model. 
The aggregated risk, denoted by the tuple , can, 
then, be used to support risk-informed decision making. 
Suppose we are considering the risk of a specific event. 
Instead of directly comparing  to the acceptance threshold, 
the maturity level should also be considered: when maturity 
level is low, a larger safety margin is required; while when 
maturity level is high, a risk close to its threshold value 
might be accepted. The relationship between maturity level 
and the required safety margin should be determined, based 
on the severity of the consequence of the event. 
Figure 1. Level of maturity framework
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IV. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY
In this case study, we are conducting the risk analysis of 
a NPP, where the quantification of risk is made by a PSA 
model. For RIDM, a summation is performed over different 
hazard contributors to permit the comparison of the yielded 
risk metrics to acceptance criteria. The risk contributors are 
classified in the ASME/ANS standards into different hazard 
groups: (i) internal events; (ii) internal floods; (iii) internal 
fires; (iv) seismic events; (v) high winds; (vi) external floods; 
(vii) other hazards [8]. In this example, only two main 
important hazard groups, i.e., Internal events (I) and External 
flooding (Ex), are considered for illustrative purposes.
PSA of these two hazard groups are conducted based on 
a combination of fault tree and event tree models. The 
resulted risk indexes are: 
= and
The two hazard groups are different in nature and the 
knowledge and experience regarding them is quite different. 
Applying the maturity framework of Figure 1, a score has 
been given to each attribute and sub-attribute, with the help 
of the guidelines indicated in Appendix 1. Suppose we have, 
for the internal events: 
,  and 
and for external flooding: 
 and . 
where and correspond to level of 
uncertainty, conservatism, knowledge and sensitivity 
respectively. are illustrated in Table A4.1. 
Then, applying Eq. (1) on the previous scores yields 
3.7 and 2.7. A two-dimensional 
representation of the level risk estimate and its level of 
maturity is presented in Figure 2. 
MHRA is, then, conducted, based on Eqs. (2) and (3):
Hence, the aggregated risk of the NPP can be represented 
as ( . 
In the previous analysis, although the risk due to external 
flooding is higher than for internal events, it should be noted 
that this value is based on a PSA with lower maturity.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
MHRA is very important for RIDM. Nevertheless, it is 
usually achieved using a simple arithmetic summation, 
which is not mathematically consistent nor physically
meaningful due to the heterogeneous nature and level of 
maturity on the risk of the different risk contributors.   
In this paper, we have proposed a framework that 
evaluates the level of maturity of risk analysis in support to 
DM. The model consists of different attributes that are 
believed to affect the maturity of risk analysis such as: 
uncertainty, conservatism etc. The maturity level is 
integrated in MHRA by developing a two-dimensional risk 
aggregation method. The method has been applied to a 
numerical example in order to show its applicability. 
APPENDIX I  EVALUATION OF SENSITIVITY
In this paper based on the literature review of several 
papers (e.g., [9]; [10]) and for simplicity, we suggest to use a 
one-at-a-time method index that measures the average of 
relative change in the dependent (output) variable  by 
altering one input  as shown in 2.  
,  (A.1) 
where  is the input parameter, n is the number of times that 
the analyst would apply the sensitivity measures by altering 
one input by an estimated suitable value (e.g., ±20).  
In case of weak knowledge, the sensitivity analysis might 
be applied on input variables with ranges that are far from 
the true values which would be misleading. To overcome this 
problem, it suggested to alter the input parameters by a value 
equals to a standard deviation ±SD.  
In this kind of analysis converging from (0) indicates that 
the model is not sensitive, while the more the results 
diverges from (0) the more sensitive the model is. It might be 
that the interpretation would vary a lot and it would be non-
meaningful to compare the sensitivity measures directly 
without trying to convert it into more meaningful scores that 
indicates in the light of the problem. A sensitivity score (1-5) 
is assigned for the sensitivity index relying on the degree that 
the index converge or diverge from 0 as illustrated in Table I. 
TABLE I. SCORES REPRESENTATION OF THE SENSITIVITY MEASURE
Interval Score Score in the light of maturity
S: ≤0.5 1 5
S : 0.5-0.667 2 4
S: 0.667-0.8 3 3
S: 0.8-0.9 4 2
S: ≥0.9 5 1Figure 2. Representation of Hazard Groups Levels of Risk and Maturity
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APPENDIX II  EVALUATION OF UNCERTAINTY
In this paper, we use the 5-level scaling system 
developed by Spiegelhalter and Riesch for uncertainty 
evaluation: 
y Level 1 of uncertainty (level 5 of certainty): This level 
of uncertainty manifests itself when the model and the 
parameters are known, and the analysis predicts a 
certain outcome with a probability P , (e.g. the 
uncertainty about the outcome in most traditional 
mathematical and philosophical problems of 
probability theory) [3]. 
y Level 2 of uncertainty (level 4 of certainty): where the 
model is known but its parameters are not. If the 
parameters are known then the model would predict an 
outcome with probability P and exhibit an uncertainty 
of level one. In other words, this type of uncertainty 
arises due to lack of empirical information, (e.g. large 
break in primary circuit of a NPP that has never 
happened) [3]. 
y Level 3 of uncertainty (level 3 of certainty): 
Uncertainty about the model’s ability to reflect reality. 
This type of uncertainty is due to the model structure 
itself and the model computer implementation 
(Defining Uncertainty A Conceptual Basis for 
Uncertainty Management in Model-Based Decision 
Support, 2003). Moreover, out of the models that we 
can use, how likely each competing model is able to 
reflect reality [3]. 
y Level 4 of uncertainty (level 2 of certainty): 
uncertainty about acknowledged inadequacies and the 
assumptions that are implicitly made (non-modeled 
uncertainty). In fact, it arises from data extrapolations, 
limitation in the computations, and any aspects that we 
are aware that they have been omitted [3].
y Level 5 of uncertainty (level 1 of certainty): 
Uncertainty about unknown deficiencies and 
inadequacies and it is corresponding to unforeseen 
events, non-modeled and non-modable risks. It is the 
uncertainty that we are not aware of or as it was 
referred to by Donald Rumsfeld “unknown unknowns” 
(2002). In fact, this type of uncertainty are usually 
acknowledged by brainstorming of that possibilities 
that we can imagine and think of, or by the 
introduction of what so called ‘fudge factors’[3]. 
APPENDIX III  EVALUATION OF KNOWLEDGE
In Table II, we tried to expand the knowledge 
characteristics suggested by [7] and adapt them to fit the risk 
assessment of NPPs. It is suggested to evaluate the level of 
knowledge relying on previously prepared questionnaire that 
has multiple answers each with specific score (1; 2; 3; and 
even number are left for intermediate cases). The scores are 
then averaged over all the characteristics and a final score is 
given for the knowledge.
TABLE II. LEVLE OF KNOWLEDGES' ATTRIBUTES EVALUATION GUIDELINES
Score 1 3 5
Data 
availability 
Amount of data/field 
data ( )
No data or the data are so limited 
and (can extracted only from the 
same type of NPPs)
The data are available and 
can be extracted from any 
other NPP
The data are Available in abundance 
(can be extracted easily from so many 
sources and places worldwide)
Data 
consistency
Source of data ( ) The data are extracted from other 
sources that is not related directly 
to the technology (not the exact 
same type of component)
Other NPPs of the same 
type and technology
Field data from the same power plant, 
and related to the same type of 
components
Quality and 
reliability of 
data
Quality of Data 
( )
Assump
tion of 
data
Data are calculated 
using statistical 
models
Data are both assumed and 
calculated using computer 
physical and mathematical 
models
Data are extracted 
using computer 
mathematical and 
physical models
The data are 
measured precisely 
and accurately, and 
then modeled
Quality of 
assumptions ( )
Represents strong simplifications Represents moderate 
simplifications
Represents reasonable simplifications
Experience Phenomenological 
understanding ( )
The   phenomena   involved   are   
not   well   understood
The phenomena involved 
are Understood but not 
completely
The phenomena involved are very well 
understood
Experience and 
knowledge regarding 
the hazard group 
( )
No experience at all Experienced such an event 
in other industries
This event is quite common and we have 
a wide experience in
Availability of models
( )
Models are non-existent or 
known to give poor predictions.
The models used are 
believed to give
predictions with moderate 
accuracy
The models used are known to give
predictions with the required accuracy
Value 
ladenness of 
the analysts
Agreement among 
peers ( )
There is strong disagreement 
among experts
There is slight agreement 
among experts
There is broad agreement among experts
Expert years in 
experience in the field 
and performance 
measure ( )
has quite short experience in risk 
assessment of NPPs
It is his specialty and he 
practiced through training 
courses regarding the same 
type of NPPs
Expert in this domain (long experience)
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APPENDIX IV  EVALUATION OF CONSERVATISM
In Figure 3 (a, b and c), based on the work of Aven (i.e.,  
taking into account the meaning of conservatism, relating the 
conservatism to the strength of knowledge in which the 
probabilities are based and evaluating the usefulness of 
conservatism in the light decision-making) [11], we tried to 
extrapolate a more tangible semi-quantitative representation 
of the conservatism with respect to the level of maturity.  
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Figure 3. Evaluation of the conservatism in the light of level of maturity (a, 
b, c: (conservatism VS Best estimate, True value/weak knowledge, True 
value/strong knowledge).
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